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FEDERAL CONTROL OF COMMERCIAL BANK MERGERS
BENJAMIN J. KLEBANERt
Prompted by the merger of 1,503 banks with over $30 billion in re-
sources during the previous decade, Congress enacted legislation in 1960
restricting bank acquisitions.' In addition to considering the major issues
raised by the divergent approaches of the Senate and House bills of 1956
and how they were resolved, this article reviews hitherto existing federal
control of bank mergers and bank holding company growth for the pur-
pose of understanding the economic issues involved in the application of
the 1960 law. The focus is on federal policy toward the preservation of
a competitive banking structure.2
t Associate Professor of Economics, The City College of New York.
1. An act to amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to require Federal approval
for mergers and consolidations of insured banks, Public Law 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (1960),
12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c) (Supp. 1961). Popularly called the 1960 Bank Merger Act, this
act amended subsection (c) of section 18 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 64 Stat.
892 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1958). The clause of the act restricting mergers now
reads as follows:
No insured bank shall merge or consolidate with any other insured bank or,
either directly or indirectly, acquire the assets of, or assume liability to pay
any deposits made in, any other insured bank without the prior written consent
(i) of the Comptroller of the Currency if the acquiring, assuming, or result-
ing bank is to be a national bank or a District bank, or (ii) of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System if the acquiring, assuming, or result-
ing bank is to be a State member bank (except a District bank), or (iii) of
the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation if the acquiring, assuming, or
resulting bank is to be a nonmember insured bank (xecept a District bank).
2. The author acknowledges with gratitude the numerous helpful suggestions of
Professor Fritz Machlup, whose Ford Foundation-sponsored Faculty Research Seminar
on Industrial Organization and Economic Theory at Johns Hopkins University during
the summer of 1958 furnished the occasion for the writing of the first draft of this pa-
per. Government documents cited frequently are indicated by Roman numerals as follows:
I. Hearings on Current Antitrust Problems Before the Antitrust Sub-
committee (Subcommittee No. 5) of the House Committee on the Judiciar y, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, May 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18; Part 3, June 7, 8, 10, 13,
14, 15, 17 (1955).
II. Hearings On a Study of the Antitrust Laws Before the Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess., Part 2, June 14, 15, 16, 21, 23, 24, 29, 30 and July 1 (1955).
III. STAFF OF SUBcon1r. No. 5, HousE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDIcIARY, 84TH
CONG., IST SESS.-, INTERIM REPORT OF THE ANTITRUST SUBCO.MMITTEE (Comm.
Print 1955).
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE 1960 LAW
In 1951 12 per cent of the banks had over 54 per cent of the total
assets of all American banks; this was "alarming, almost shocking" to
Representative Patman.' Congressman Celler fears the present merger
trend will, unless stopped by law, restructure our banks along the British
and German pattern, where a few giants control the financial industry.
From the fact that the hundred largest banks controlled 48 per cent of the
deposits of all commercial banks, Celler found "an alarming concentra-
tion of financial power in the hands of a few banks" and considered this
"trend toward monolithic banks" a matter of grave national concern."
Arguing that the agencies which control the nation's credit necessarily
control its industry and ultimately its politics, Senator Douglas suggested
IV. Hearings on Bank Mergers Before the Antitrust Subcomuzittee (Sub-
committee No. 5) of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. July 5, 6 (1955).
V. H.R. REP. No. 1417, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
VI. Hearings on Legislation Affecting Corporate Mergers Before the
Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., May 23, 24, 25, 28, 31 and June 2 (1956).
VII. Hearings on Regidation of Bank Mergers Before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., June 12, 18
(1956).
VIII. S. REP. No. 2583, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
IX. Hearings on, the Study of Banking Laws Before the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currenwy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 1, Nov., 1956; Part 2, Jan.
and Feb., 1957 (1956-57).
X. Hearings on the Financial Institutions Act of 1957 Before the House
Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, July and
August, 1957; Part 2, Jan. and Feb., 1958 (1957-58).
XI. Hearings on Premerger Notification Before the Antitrust Subcominit-
tee (Subcommittee No. 5) of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1957).
XII. Hearings on the Regulation of Bank Mergers and S. 1o62 Before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., March 18,
19 (1959).
XIII. Regulation of Bank Mergers, S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959).
XIV. Hearings on Regulation of Bank Mergers and S. 1o62 Before Sub-
committee No. 2 of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess., Feb. 16, 17, 18 (1960).
XV. Regulation of Bank Mergers, H.R. Rm. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960).
3. Hearings on the Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies and H.R.
2674 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 22
(1955). Senator Sparkman called the increase in bank mergers in 1955 over 1953 "shock-
ing." VI at 12. The Federal Reserve Board sounded no alarm in 1930 when it an-
noimced that as of mid-1929 one per cent of the nations' banks had half the resources.
16 FED. REsavE BULL. 30 (1930).
4. I at 446; 101 CONG. R c. 3913 (1955) ; 103 CONr. REc. 6150 (1957). See also
Celler's comments in VI at 121 and IX at 5. Compare Senator Robertson's comments,
XIV at 8. Celler did not mention that in 1940 the share of the one hundred largest banks
was 57.6% of all commercial bank deposits and at the end of 1960 their share was 46%.
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checking the concentration of banking and rolling it back if possible.5
The Small Business Committee of the House of Representatives attri-
buted the declining position of small business partly to the "disappearance
of banks."'
Such expressions of concern are by no means universal. "Stern and
aggressive competition" characterizes banking today, in the view of the
American Bankers Association: "In no other regulated industry does
competition exist in numbers and in intensity to the degree it exists in
the banking industry."'  Former Comptroller of the Currency Gidney
confirmed that "everywhere there is healthy banking competition, pos-
sibly the keenest and most effective we have ever had."'  Competition in
banking is generally "quite keen," and legislation which would hinder
bank mergers should be opposed, according to Professor Nadler's group.'
It is usually agreed that "the economic and social premises of the
Sherman Act in respect of other businesses are not fully accepted by the
Congress, the States or the public as the only considerations applicable to
deposit banking," as Professor Berle has pointed out."0 Legislation and
regulation compel standards of behavior which competition may not
breach. As suppliers of the media of exchange used for the bulk of busi-
ness transactions, banks are restrained from practices inimical to their
solvency. Bank failures are far more grave in their consequences than
insolvency of other businesses. Hence the legal restraints on entry and
price competition for funds. The dangers of a fractional reserve arrange-
ment, whereby most assets are not one hundred per cent liquid, have led
to regulation of the minimum quality of banks' earning assets.
The prolonged impasse in Congress preceding the passage of the
1960 Bank Merger Act reflected basic differences concerning the weight
to be accorded to competitive considerations in assessing bank mergers.
It is a thesis of this article that the preservation of competition in those
areas where it is permitted is a matter of vital public concern despite com-
mercial banking's status as regulated industry.
As early as 1913 the Pujo Committee had recommended the restric-
tion and control of national bank mergers in the public interest. By em-
5. 102 CONG. REc. 6857 (1956). See also H.R. RE,. No. 2970, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
33 (1956) ; XIII at 28 (Senator Douglas, et al.).
6. 105 CoNG. REc. 8113 (1959).
7. VII at 99; XII at 70; XIV at 113. See also IV at 41. The American Bankers
Association told the Senate Judiciary Committee that "probably no industry has more
excessive or intensive competition amongst their members. . . ." VI at 35.
8. XIV at 6, 43. See also 92 COMPTROLLER ANN. RE'. 10-11 (1955); II at 710.
9. NADLER, THE BANKING SITUATION IN NEW YORK STATE 8, 87 (1956).
10. Berle, Banking Under the Antitrust Laws, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 589, 592, 602
(1949). Similarly Edward G. Gruis has argued that "banks appear to enjoy a status
somewhere between a public utility and a private enterprise." Gruis, Antitrast Laws and
Their Application to Banking, 24 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv. 105 (1955).
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powering the Comptroller of the Currency to prohibit consolidations
where an "undue concentration of control" threatened, they believed the
"rapid disappearance of competition" could be checked." The Clayton
Antitrust Act of 1914 placed acquisitions of bank stock under the juris-
diction of the Federal Reserve Board." In practice this affected only
bank holding companies.
In the controversy over branch banking, fear of financial concentra-
tion and monopoly was one of the strong arguments used." Member
banks were finally granted very limited branch banking privileges in
1927,'" but neither this act nor the 1918 act providing for the first time
a simplified means to consolidate national banks made any reference to
competitive criteria. 5
In 1945, when Congress considered amending the merger provisions
of the 1914 law to include asset acquisitions, the Federal Reserve wanted
sizeable banks to prove that the proposed merger "would be consistent
with the public interest"; one of the criteria suggested was "that the ac-
quisition would not substantially lessen competition, restrain trade, or
tend to create a monopoly."' 6  In 1947 however, the Board of Governors
announced that it was not primarily interested in scrutinizing proposed
acquisitions by banks, as state and other federal agencies already had the
power to supervise mergers. Rather the Board sought power to control
"unbridled expansion" of bank holding companies. The 1947 merger
bill (unlike the 1945 one) had no provision for Federal Reserve authority
over bank asset consolidation, and the Federal Reserve Board made no
specific request for such power. The 1950 amendment to section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which extended the 1914 ban on stock acquisitions threaten-
ing competition to asset acquisitions as well, did not include banks.' The
11. H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 142, 163 (1913).
12. 38 Stat. 730-32, 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17-19, 21 (1958).
13. CHAPMAN AND WESTERFIELD, BRANCH BANKING 72, 74 (1942); CHAPITAN,
CONCENTRATION OF BANKING 111 (1934). Strong arguments against branch banking on
antitrust grounds were presented by two California bankers in Hearings on the Consoli-
dation of National Banking Associations Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 220, 308 (1926).
14. 44 Stat. 1228 (1927).
15. 40 Stat. 1043 (1918).
16. Hearings on the Amendment of Sections 7 and ii of the Clayton Act Before
Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 337-
38, 362 (1945). The 1945 bill had such a public interest provision only for sizeable
corporations subject to the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction. The Final Report
of the Temporary National Economic Committee, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
38-39 (1941), proposed legislation covering asset acquisitions but did not specifically in-
clude banks.
17. Hearings on Amending Sections 7 and i of the Clayton Act Before Subcom-
mnittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1947).
Bank holding company legislation was requested by the Board of Governors in the
BD. Govs. ANN. REP. 34-37 (1944). There is no testimony from the Board of Governors
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omission has been explained on the ground that it "became impracticable
to include" banks as the bill underwent successive revisions over the
years.'"
Earlier in 1950 the capital gains tax obstacle to national bank
mergers was removed by the "two-way street" law allowing a national
bank to be merged directly into a state bank without the necessity of the
Comptroller's approval in those (thirty-one) states where state banks
may merge with national banks without the consent of state authorities."0
Mergers were also facilitated by legislation enacted in 1952. Stockholders
of a national bank who dissented to the absorption of another bank lost
the right to receive the cash value of their shares.20
Concern for the preservation of competition in banking was demon-
strated in 1956 by the enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act.2'
Section 1842(c) of that act, "Factors governing determination of appli-
cation for approval," has the following to say with respect to competition:
In determining whether or not to approve any acquisition or
merger or consolidation under this section, the [Federal Re-
serve] Board shall take into consideration the following fac-
tors : . . . (5) whether or not the effect of such acquisition or
merger or consolidation would be to expand the size or extent
in the other hearings on amending Section 7: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary to Amend an Act Entitled "An Act to Supplement Ex-
isting Laws Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies," 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (ms.,
National Archives 1947-48) ; Hearings on Amending Sec. 7 and 1I of the Clayton Act
(H.R. 988, H.R. 2006, H.R. 2734) Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ; Hearings on Corporate Mergers and Ac-
quisitions and H.R. 2734 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the .Tudi-
ciary, 81st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess's. (1950).
18. STAFF OF Suncoum. No. 5, HOUSE CoMM. ON THE JUDIcrARY, 82D CONG., 2D
SESS., BANK MERGERS AND CONCENTRATION OF BANKING FACILITIES 7 (Comm. Print
1952). Judge Barnes argued that Congress had not intended to create this antitrust
exemption for banks. VII at 77.
19. 64 Stat. 456 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1958). When the two-way street
law was being considered only Representative Folger inquired about its implications for
monopoly. The two witnesses to whom he addressed the question dismissed it as a con-
sideration. Hearings on a Bill to Provide for the Conversion of National Banking As-
sociations Into and Their Merger or Consolidation with State Banks Before the House
Conimittee on Banking and Currency, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 50 (ms. Federal Reserve
Library, June 9, 1948). Neither S. REP. No. 1104 nor H.R. REP. No. 1083, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949) on the 1950 law refer to the antimonopoly aspect of mergers. The same
is true of H.R. REI. No. 2421, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) on the 1952 bill. One large
merger cancelled because of minority stockholders' rights to cash involved the Manufac-
turers and the New York Trust companies. Business Week, May 31, 1952, p. 29.
Twenty-nine mergers took place under the 1952 procedure between the date of the
August 17, 1950 enactment and May 17, 1955. I at 449.
20. 66 Stat. 599 (1952), 12 U.S.C. § 34(b) (1958).
21. 70 Stat. 133-46 (1956), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1958). On the two-pronged drive
to preserve competition in banking, see Hearings on Bank Holding Legislation Before
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953) ; S. REP.
No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
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of the bank holding company system involved beyond limits
consistent with adequate and sound banking, the public interest,
and the preservation of competition in the field of banking.22
Separate bills to regulate bank mergers were also passed in 1956,
but the two houses were unable to compromise their differences until
1960. The House simply included banks in the 1950 Celler-Kefauver
Act's ban on asset acquisitions, the effect of which "may be substantially
to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly."23  This antitrust
test contrasted with a Senate amendment to the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act passed several months later which proposed a public utility
type of test: the federal agencies were to consider whether the effect of
a bank merger "may be to lessen competition unduly or to tend unduly to
create a monopoly," in addition to the six banking criteria already spelled
out in the branch approval section of the act.24 This was again adopted
by the Senate in 1957 as part of the proposed Financial Institutions Act,23
and in 1959 as a separate bill.2"
In supporting the House bill, the Department of Justice firmly op-
posed special antitrust treatment for any particular industry: each indus-
try obviously differs and the "peculiar nature" of banking would be
recognized in applying the general standards; further, public policy de-
mands as much competition in banking as in industry generally. 7 The
Department feared that the establishment of a weaker standard for bank-
ing would lead to efforts to spread the same standard to industry gen-
erally. The courts would take years to interpret the "unduly" test. Mean-
while, the banks and agencies would be without a guide. Senators Doug-
las, Monroney, and Clark joined in warning that the courts might decide
in the end that "unduly" is a relative term, outside the bounds of legal
definition, and give limitless discretion to the banking agencies. 8
The Senate version was drafted jointly by the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Board of
22. 70 Stat. 134 (1956), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1958).
23. The text of H.R. 5984 is printed in 102 CONG. REc. 2108-09 (1956). It passed
the House of Representatives on February 6, 1956. 102 CONG. REc. 2110 (1956).
24. S. 3911 passed the Senate on July 25, 1956. The text is in 102 CONG. R.C.
14,373 (1956).
25. The Senate passed the Financial Institutions Act of 1957 on March 21, 1957.
103 CONG. Rc. 4140 (1957).
26. S. 1062 was passed May 14, 1959. 105 CONG. REc. 8144 (1959).
27. IV at 11, 15; VII at 71 (Barnes) ; X at 131, 32 (Hansen) ; IX at 1014; XI
at 16, 18 (Brownell). See also VI at 120 (Rep. Celler) ; VII at 110 (FTC Chairman
Gwynne).
28. See VII at 62 (Barnes) ; X at 1175 (Harding of the Independent Bankers As-
sociation) ; S. REP. No. 121, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1957) (Douglas, et al.). Senator
O'Mahoney urged support of the Clayton test because of the need to "definitely and
rigidly establish certain landmarks which cannot be set aside by the discretionary control
of a few men who may change overnight." VI at 60.
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Governors of the Federal Reserve. Support also came from such organi-
zations as the American Bankers Association and the Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States, chiefly on the ground that banking differs
fundamentally from industries subject to Federal Trade Commission jur-
isdiction." Senator Robertson described banks as "quasi-public utili-
ties,"3 while Fulbright spoke to his Senate colleagues of the desirability
of regulating banks as "quasi-utilities and monopolies. . . ."" The
FDIC, in describing banking as "probably the most supervised and regu-
lated industry" in the country, said that banking agencies ought not to be
bound by precedents established in unregulated industries not comparable
to banking. Merger transactions duly consummated pursuant to the
authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission and the Federal Power Commission are excluded
from the scope of the Clayton Act. Analogous treatment should be
extended to banking, it was argued. Application of Clayton Act stand-
ards to banking was believed to run counter to the policy of careful regu-
lation of the industry.32 The federal banking agencies insisted that bank-
ing factors must be weighed alongside competitive factors in determining
the legality of mergers.3" A rule of reason approach would allow the
banking system to function properly, according to Gidney.3"
The "unduly" test was intended to permit mergers in the public in-
terest which might substantially lessen competition.3" To illustrate, Sena-
tor Fulbright cited five situations where bank mergers would serve the
national welfare despite the fact that competition might be substantially
lessened:
(1) where the acquired bank's future prospects are unfavorable
because of inadequate management or lack of provision
for management succession;
(2) where the acquired bank has inadequate capital or unsound
assets;
29. VII at 45-46; X at 985-86; XII at 1, 69, 122. See also VII at 4; XII at 23.
30. 102 CONG. REc. 14,347 (1956).
31. 105 CONG. REc. 7692, 8143 (1959). Federal Reserve Governor Robertson re-
ferred to banks as "a quasi-public institution." IX at 2175. For a good criticism of
the utility analogy see 105 CONG. REc. 8138 (1959) (Proxmire).
32. XIV at 84; XII at 48; XI at 216. For the public utility argument see also:
statements by the American Bankers Association, IX at 100, XI at 252; XIV at 113-16;
the New York County Lawyers Association, IV at 36; McCloy of the Chase Manhattan,
IV at 19. Comptroller Gidney also stressed the undesirability of precedents of non-
regulated industries. XI at 194.
33. IX at 14; XIV at 12-13 (Gidney) ; IX at 206; VI at 50 (Board of Governors).
34. VI at 79-81. Similarly, Roth of Franklin National, VI at 94.
35. VII at 10 (Fulbright) ; VII at 32 (Comptroller's Office) ; VII at 48; X at
710 (FDIC); IV at 51; IX at 2175 (Board of Governors). See also IV at 38 (N.Y.
Chamber of Commerce).
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(3) where the acquired bank is an uneconomic unit or is too
small to meet the needs of the community by providing
loans of sufficient size or necessary banking facilities;
(4) where there is a reasonable probability of the ultimate
failure of the bank to be acquired; or
(5) where several banks in a small community are compelled by
an "overbanked" situation to resort to unsound competi-
tive practices which may eventually have an adverse effect
upon the condition of such banks."8
The FDIC also feared that the adoption of the Clayton test would
seriously hamper its rescue operations: the conditions under which the
International Shoe"7 precedent permitted failing firms to merge were too
restrictive. The agency considered action desirable when a bank is
merely heading towards insolvency rather than on the brink of disaster.3"
The Antitrust Division retorted that it had not prosecuted mergers where
management inadequacy, obsolete plant or a failing market made the pros-
pect of survival dim, and that it would consider carefully the banking
agency's view of a "bank's chances to prosper."39 The FDIC then pointed
to the 1955 assumption of the deposits of the Frontier Trust Company,
the larger of the two banks in Fort Fairfield, Maine, by the Northern
National Bank of Presque Isle as an example, recognized by the Depart-
ment of Justice itself, of an action not permitted by the International
Shoe doctrine."0
It is easy to exaggerate the differences between supporters of the
antitrust test and of the public utility test. Fulbright's committee aimed
to "put a real inhibition on bank mergers." In the absence of such excep-
tional circumstances as the five enumerated above, the banking agencies
were instructed to apply the "unduly" test "rigorously to preserve com-
petition in the banking fields." 1  A basic purpose of the Senate bill, in
the words of the Committee on Banking and Currency, was "to promote
competition as an indispensable element in a sound banking system."' 2
36. VIII at 6. An earlier version is in VII at 10. Actual cases from the files of
the Federal Reserve are printed in VI at 454. See also XII at 72 (American Bankers
Association)..
37. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
38. XII at 59; XI at 219; IV at 61-62. The sale of an insolvent concern may not
be exempt if there is a "reasonable possibility" that it can stay in business. Note,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 CoLu.%i. L. REv. 765, 780 (1952).
39. Barnes, The Antitrust Division Looks at Bank Mergers, 182 COMMERCIAL AND
FINANcIAL CmONicLE 1408 (1955). See also VI at 157-58; IX at 1017.
40. VI at 93; XII at 59. See also Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The
"Failing Company" Myth, 49 GEo. IJ. 84, 98 (1960).
41. 103 CONG. REc. 4132 (1957). See VIII at 6 for a similar statement by Senator
Fulbright.
42. XIII at 23. Independently, the Senate judiciary Committee said much the
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According to the FDIC, the bill would "prevent those mergers which re-
sult in gTeater banking concentration, a lessening of competition, and
provide little or no benefit to the public."43 The House Judiciary Com-
mittee, sponsoring the Clayton approach, agreed that in the type of cases
enumerated by Fulbright the merger should be allowed.44 In 1955 the
three federal agencies were willing to accept the "substantially" test pro-
vided an escape clause was inserted which would enable them to continue
to approve mergers in the public interest.4
In sponsoring the 1960 bill4 which became law, the House Banking
Committee expressed "concern for the maintenance of vigorous competi-
tion in the banking system.... ." The measure finally enacted in 1960
includes that committee's proposal to require the federal banking agency
responsible for passing on a merger to consider, in addition to six im-
portant banking factors,4" "the effect of the transaction on competition
(including any tendency toward monopoly)."" Moreover, the agency
"shall not approve the transaction unless, after considering all of such
factors, it finds the transaction to be in the public interest.""0
The suggestion to enact Clayton standards plus a list of specific ex-
empted situations was rejected on the grounds that it was impossible to
anticipate every situation where a merger would benefit the public. Con-
same thing in S. REP. No. 2817, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1956). Almost identical lan-
guage is used in S. REP. No. 132, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1957). Attorney General
Brownell felt the Senate bill was doing little more than giving "lip service to insure
competitive enterprise in banking." XI at 73; similarly Barnes in VI at 157.
43. XIV at 83-84.
44. V at 5-6; XII at 98-99; XIV at 128 (Celler). A similar stand was taken by
the Independent Bankers Association. XIV at 174, 178. Douglas, Monroney and Clark
were prepared to modify the "substantially" test by allowing mergers which would pre-
vent the "probable failure" of a bank. S. RFP. No. 121, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 102
(1957). In 1960 the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice was prepared "to
try to meet the problem of specialized banking needs by applying the general Clayton
Act standard and carving out particular exceptions. . . ." XIV at 170.
45. IV at 52, 63, 64, 75; XV at 5. The device of using "substantially" language
in the bill and then qualifying it in the accompanying report was strongly condemned
by the Federal Reserve (XI at 241) and the FDIC (XI at 220-21) in pressing for the
"unduly" test in 1957. The Comptroller of the Currency called the proposed exceptions
"inadequate and too restrictive." XIV at 57.
46. Senate 1062 (1960).
47. XV at 5.
48. The six banking factors to be considered are as follows:
(1) The financial history and condition of each of the banks involved,
(2) the adequacy of its capital structure,
(3) its future earnings prospects,
(4) the general character of its management,
(5) the convenience and needs of the community to be served, and
(6) whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes ot
this Act.
With minor changes in language, these are the very same factors the FDIC has had to
consider in approving branch applications.
49. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c) (Supp. 1961).
50. Ibid.
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gress at the same time turned down the "unduly" approach, which would
resolve doubts in favor of bank mergers. Proponents have the burden of
proving that a bank merger is in the public interest, according to the
House Report on the bill.51 Representative Celler was satisfied that the
1960 test is stronger than the Senate's original "unduly" criterion.52 On
the other hand, Senator Fulbright interpreted the new wording to express
nothing more than what the Senate intended by "unduly"; no one factor
is to control, and all seven must be weighed and a beneficial result must
appear before a merger can be approved.5"
Perhaps as significant as the argument involving the criterion for
approving a merger was the disagreement whether to grant the Depart-
ment of Justice concurrent jurisdiction with the federal agencies over
competitive standards for bank asset acquisitions. The Clayton Act of
1914 gave the Attorney General concurrent jurisdiction with the Board
of Governors over bank stock acquisitions, 4 an arrangement undisturbed
by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956." Cooperation in this area
between the Board and the Attorney General had been most commend-
able, according to the House Committee on Banking and Currency." The
1956 House bill would have given the Attorney General authority to deal
with asset acquisitions as well." In 1955 the Board of Governors pro-
posed to give the Attorney General the decisive veto; further, if the re-
sponsible supervisory agency did not consult with him, the Attorney
General would retain full power to proceed against mergers despite their
approval by the appropriate agency."8
The Independent Bankers Association, made up mainly of small
banks, supported the Attorney General's position. Some Congressmen
endorsed the view that the Antitrust Division was best qualified to decide
questions of competition and monopoly." The other side argued that
the federal agencies are expert in banking matters and should be given
power over mergers comparable to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion's: the Department of Justice cannot challenge an ICC-appoved
merger under the Clayton Act. However, the 1950 amendment to the
Clayton Act did give the Attorney General "the right to intervene and
51. XV at 11-12.
52. 106 CONG. REc. 7258 (1960).
53. Id. at 9712.
54. 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
55. 70 Stat. 133-46 (1956), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1958).
56. XV at 13.
57. I at 2173.
58. XII at 66.
59. VII at 72, 74, 82, 85; X at 131, 134 (Antitrust Division) ; XI at 255-57; XII
at 120-21 (Independent Bankers Association) ; VIII at 10, 11; XII at 102-05. In 1960
the Justice Department unsuccessfully proposed a public hearing with opportunity for
court review in cases where it differed from a banking agency. XIV at 169.
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appear" in proceedings when agencies like the ICC and the CAB issue a
complaint under section 7."°
In 1956 the Board of Governors shifted its attitude and joined the
two other federal banking agencies in support of the Senate bill. Under
Senate versions prior to 1959 an agency could request an opinion at its
discretion from the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
The 1960 law requires an agency to obtain an opinion on the competitive
aspects of each merger from the Attorney General. However, the final
decision rests with the Comptroller if the resulting institution is to be a
national bank, the FDIC if an insured nonmember bank, and the Board
of Governors for a state member bank. Each agency now has exclusive
jurisdiction over mergers within its sphere, but must consult with the
other two on all applications, for the sake of uniformity of enforcement
standards regarding the competitive factors provision of the 1960 law."'
FDIC opposition to the 1956 House bill stemmed in part from the
occasional need for speedy action. The 1960 law allows the Attorney
General only ten days to file his opinion in case of an emergency. In
order to prevent a probable failure, an agency can even act without get-
ting a prior report from the Attorney General.6 2
One reason for the Comptroller's opposition to the Clayton ap-
proach was that giving the Board of Governors sole power among the
federal agencies over asset acquisitions would create an unjustifiable im-
balance among the federal agencies."2 The state supervisory authorities
were concerned with the protection of the dual banking system and of
states' rights. Although no merger of state-chartered banks could be
considered by a federal agency until approved by the state, the state
authorities preferred no additional legislation in this area. When federal
regulation was imminent, the state authorities sought to insure parity of
treatment of state and national banks, (and to remove any incentive to
convert to national charters) by empowering the FDIC to pass on na-
tional bank acquisitions after the Comptroller had given his approval,
60. X at 23; IX at 206-07; IV at 64; VI at 27; X at 1043-44 (American Bankers
Association) ; IX at 100, 583 (Association of Reserve City Bankers) ; IV at 38; X at
1206 (U. S. Chamber of Commerce); XII at 23 (Comptroller of the Currency); XII
at 51; XI at 216 (FDIC).
H.R. 6405, introduced by Rep. Celler on May 23, 1955 but not passed by the House,
would have used the Clayton test with the added proviso of exclusive jurisdiction in the
Federal banking agencies. Ordinarily this administrative procedure was linked with the
"unduly" test.
61. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c) (Supp. 1961).
62. XII at 59; XI at 220-21.
63. ii at 730.
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just as it would pass on state banks. They also approved consultation
with the Attorney General, a procedure some state supervisors follow.
0 4
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL BANK MERGERS
BEFORE 1960
The largest single merger in American banking history, the 1955
formation of the Chase Manhattan Bank, did not require federal appro-
val. Until 1960 insured banks needed federal consent to merge or con-
solidate with an insured state bank only if the aggregate capital or sur-
plus of the resulting or assuming bank would be less than the aggregate
capital or surplus, respectively, of all the merging or consolidating banks.
Under such circumstances, if the assuming or resulting insured state bank
was to be a member of the Federal Reserve System (except a District
bank), written permission was required from the Board of Governors;
if it was to be a nonmember insured bank (except a District bank),
written permission was needed from the FDIC; and if it was to be a
District or national bank, permission was required from the Comptroller
of the Currency. 5 Permission from the Comptroller was also required
for the consolidation of two national banks or for the merger of a na-
tional bank or state bank into a national bank. 6 Mergers coming within
the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 could not be
carried out without prior approval of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve."r
In passing on bank mergers before May 13, 1960 the agencies
claimed to consider competitive factors despite the absence of any specific
statutory provisions."a The FDIC weighed the congressional policy to-
64. XIV at 188-89, 194. For earlier statements, see VI at 148, 152; VII at 109;
IX at 582; X at 1054. In 1959 the state supervisors were undecided as between the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC for the final review agency.
XII at 76. The American Bankers Association wanted the responsible Federal agency
to consult with the state banking authority when the continuing bank was state-chartered.
X at 1176. Assurances were given that the federal agencies would continue to work
very closely with the states. VII at 16-17; cited with approval VIII at 7. The House
bill left no banks outside of federal jurisdiction but the Senate excluded noninsured
banks on the ground that no significant anti-competitive consequences are to be feared
from a category which has less than 1V2% of all commercial bank assets. VIII at 7;
X at 723, 1396.
65. 64 Stat. 891 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1958). This act is included as part
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, 64 Stat. 873-94 (1950), 12 U.S.C. §§
1811-31 (1958). For a list of state bank mergers from 1955 to 1959 which did not re-
quire federal approval, see XIV, 32-36.
Federal approval by the FDIC was also required by this section before an insured
bank could merge or consolidate with any noninsured bank or institution or convert into
a noninsured bank or institution. National bank deposit assumption cases required the
Comptroller's approval only when the capital or surplus was reduced.
66. 40 Stat. 1043 (1918), 12 U.S.C. 33 (1958); 66 Stat 599 (1952), 12 U.S.C.
34(b) (1958).
67. 70 Stat 133-46 (1956), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1958).
68. I at 2184.
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ward competition embodied in the 1950 amendment to the Clayton Act
with respect to the convenience and needs of the relevant community.69
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve viewed its responsibili-
ties as including the approval of only those mergers which are in the pub-
lic interest. The Federal Reserve Banks were instructed to consider the
factors of tendency to monopoly or "undesirable competitive advantage
in relation to other banks in the area involved," in transmitting to the
Board merger and branch applications from their districts. The Board
informally disapproved mergers many times for competitive reasons.7"
Likewise the Comptroller, though not required to do so by any stat-
ute before 1960, would not sanction a national bank merger that lessened
competition unduly.7' In addition to numerous banking factors, 2 the
Comptroller surveyed competitive aspects such as the relevant commercial
banking market structure and available alternative financial institutions."3
Lending policies of the merging banks, common borrowers, characteris-
tics of the deposits, branch distribution, trust activities and charges for
loans and services were all considered. A probable lessening of competi-
tion would be weighed against any positive banking factors in reaching
a decision. One of the most important questions the Comptroller had to
answer was the effect of a merger on the availability of credit to worthy
applicants. In the opinion of recent-Comptroller Gidney, the mergers he
approved have not tended to diminish availability, and he is convinced
they have made for more rather than less competition. 4
Not a single merger was disapproved for competitive reasons by
Comptroller Delano or his successor Gidney from 1950 through 1954."5
During the next five years, competitive factors were involved in nine
69. 105 CONG. REc. 8076 (1959) ; XIV at 73.
70. XIV at 73; X at 27; I at 2170; II at 686, 696; XII at 66; New York Times,
Dec. 7, 1958, pt. 3, p. 5.
71. XII at 43-45; I at 450, 452-53, 473, 493; VI at 66; XI at 123. The Comptroller
suggested that before 1959 he had used the "substantially" criterion inconsidering merger
applications. Compare XII at 36. In 1960 acting Antitrust Division head Bicks pointed
out that Comptroller Gidney claimed the use of the Clayton test while opposing its in-
corporation in the proposed merger bill. XIV at 169.
72. The banking factors used by the Comptroller were very similar to the factors
enumerated in the 1960 Bank Merger Act. See note 48 supra.
73. The "balance" of the prevailing banking market structure is still of great im-
portance to the Comptroller. See text following note 92 infra.
74. VII at 13-14, 18; XI at 203-04; I at 479. On one occasion the Comptroller ex-
plained that while the "level" of competition was unchanged in cases where his office
approved mergers, the "form of competition may have changed somewhat." I at 468.
The Comptroller informed the rapidly growing Franklin National Bank on Long Island
that additional mergers would not be in the public interest as unhealthy speculation in
that bank's stock had been stimulated by previous mergers and rumors of new acquisi-
tions. VI at 104; New York Times, Nov. 24, 1955, p. 47. The ban on further mergers
was lifted within two years. New York Times, Sept. 12, 1957, p. 45.
75. XIV at 62.
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formal and thirteen informal disapprovals.' Many informal refusals
were for reasons other than competition. 7
The federal banking agencies have been criticized for considering
"the need for competition a mere headache" and being concerned more
"with the financial . . . soundness of banks than their competitive posi-
tion."7  Senators Douglas, Monroney and Clark accused these agencies of
lacking faith in the need for competition. In the view of these men the
record of merger disapprovals "could hardly be called vigorous. ' 7' From
1950 through 1959 the Comptroller's office approved 817 mergers. Rep-
resentative Celler told the 1957 convention of the Independent Bankers
Association that Gidney's "normal procedure is to rubber-stamp as a mat-
ter of routine, any monopolistic proposal that may be presented."8" In
defense of the Comptroller, Senator Robertson suggested that the ab-
sence of specific statutory authorization and the possibility that a bank
might take out a state charter prevented Gidney from taking a strong
stand against mergers before 1960.81
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice investigated
proposed bank mergers on three occasions in 1955 and 1956. Following
a negative reaction to a requested merger clearance, the Marine Midland
Trust Company of Central New York gave up the idea of acquiring the
Auburn Trust Company. 2 After a letter from the Department of Jus-
tice indicating an antitrust problem, New York State Banking Superin-
tendent Mooney disapproved the acquisition by the Manufacturers and
Traders Trust Company of the only medium sized Buffalo bank. Had
the merger been permitted, two banks would have controlled ninety-eight
per cent of Buffalo's bank assets."5 In the third case, the Comptroller
held up approval of the acquisition of the People's Savings Bank by the
Michigan National Bank, the only other bank in Port Huron (population
36,000) after being informed that an antitrust investigation was in
progress. In 1960 the Michigan Supreme Court ordered divesture of the
stock. 4 The Comptroller was in liaison with the Department of Justice
76. XII at 36. Compare XI at 172, 209; VII at 28.
77. IV at 77.
78. S. REP'. No. 121, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 101-02 (1957).
79. XIII at 25-26. (Proxmire and Muskie here replaced Monroney). See also
102 CONG. REc. 14,348 (1956) (Douglas) and a similar stand by O'Mahoney at 14,354.
See also 103 CoNG. REc. 6151 (1957).
80. III at 115. In one place Celler said he was not singling out Gidney; his re-
marks applied to preceding Comptrollers as well. X at 1479. For other criticisms of
the Comptroller see III at 36-37 (Democratic members of House Judiciary Committee)
X at 1144, 1355 (Denver National Bank Director Brody).
81. XIII at 15.
82. IX at 1015.
83. XII at 44.
84. People's Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 102 N.W.2d 777, 779 (1960).
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in five other instances in 1956, and four times in 1955."5 The Antitrust
Division's finding that the Chemical-New York Trust Company merger
"may substantially lessen competition and tend to create a monopoly" did
not prevent New York's Superintendent of Banking, who had not re-
quested the opinion, from approving this combination.8 6 The two largest
New Haven banks dropped the idea of a merger in 1959 after the De-
partment of Justice informed them of plans for a suit under the Sher-
man Act." A number of proposed mergers have been dropped after De-
partment of Justice conferences with the banks involved."
III. ASSESSING THE COMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF MERGERS
The federal agencies passing on commercial bank mergers under the
1960 law must consider seven factors. The six banking factors listed
earlier 9 do not call for explanation. Undoubtedly most of the contro-
versy and litigation will center around the seventh factor: "the effect of
the transaction on competition (including any tendency toward monop-
oly)." 9  A similar situation exists under the 1956 Bank Holding Com-
pany Act: the Board of Governors must consider, in addition to bank-
ing factors," whether a bank acquisition or merger would "expand the
size or extent of the bank holding company system involved beyond limits
consistent with adequate and sound banking, the public interest, and the
preservation of competition in the field of banking."
2
It must be noted that an exception to the emphasis on competitive
factors seems to exist with regard to the Comptroller's serious concern
over the preservation of "balanced" banking structures. In the first writ-
ten opinion handed down by any Comptroller of the Currency, the merger
of New York City's second largest bank was recently disapproved, but
not on antitrust grounds.9" Noting that the merger would neither sub-
stantially lessen competition nor result in a tendency toward monopoly,
the Comptroller elicited:
There has been a considerable overemphasis placed upon an
85. XI at 174. There were no instances of such liaison from 1951 through 1954.
86. New York State Superintendent of 'Banks, New York Times, Aug. 24, 1959,
p. 29; 106 ANN. REP. N.Y. ST. SUPT. OF BANKS pt. 1, 15-16 (1957).
87. XIV at 162; Jan. 4, 1960 Antitrust Division Release, p. 4.
88. IX at 1020.
89. See note 48 supra.
90. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(c) (Supp. 1961).
91. The banking factors are: "(1) the financial history and condition of the com-
pany or companies and the banks concerned; (2) their prospects; (3) the character of
their management; (4) the convenience, needs and welfare of the communities and the
area concerned; . . . . " 70 Stat. 134 (1956), 12 U.S.C. 1842(c) (1958).
92. Ibid. For background of this section of the 1956 Act see Klebaner, The Bank
HoldihW Company Act of x956, 24 SOUTH. EcoN. J. 313-26 (1958).
93. Treasury Dept., Comptroller of the Currency's Decision, Dec. 19, 1961.
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alleged lack of competition in banking, and an alleged concen-
tration in banking. To the contrary, banking is highly competi-
tive. It is diffuse rather than concentrated, and the smaller in-
stitutions by and large are growing at a faster rate than are the
largest banks. We find no reason for concern over the future
of competition in banking. 4
The merger was disapproved on the grounds that joining the First Na-
tional City Bank with the National Bank of Westchester "would cause
an unreasonable distortion and dislocation in the present and future bank-
ing structure in Westchester County not consistent with the public in-
terest according to the standards set forth in the Federal banking laws,
particularly the so-called Bank Merger Act.""5
To illuminate the competitive factors pertinent to commercial bank-
ing the only precedents thus far available are the Transamerica litigation
under the Clayton Act, the opinions of the Board of Governors under the
1956 law, and the brief statements accompanying the numerous merger
approvals under the 1960 law.9" Our interest is in the light these opinions
throw on certain broad issues of public policy as they exist within the
ideal of preservation of a competitive commercial banldng structure:
substitutes, the relevant geographic market, and new entry.
Substitutes. Using its 1914 powers for the first (and only) time,
the Reserve Board issued a complaint against Transamerica Corpora-
tion on June 24, 1948. The bank holding company sought in reply to
demonstrate the overwhelming importance to commercial banks of com-
petition from suppliers of substitute services. Competition between bank-
ing offices, Neil Jacoby testified, is but "a minor factor in the level of
competitive behavior that we get in banking." 7 The effective rivalry of
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid. The First National City Bank operates 85 branches in New York City,
3 in Nassau County, 79 foreign branches, and has received approval to establish 2
branches in Westchester County. National Bank of Westchester has 26 branches, all in
Westchester. With regard to a balanced structure, the Comptroller held as follows:
Should this merger be approved, the banking structure in Westchester County
would consist of County Trust Company with 41 branches, The First National
City Bank with 27 branches, 7 much smaller commercial banks with a total of
33 branches, and three branches of other New York City banks. Of the five
largest New York City competitors of The First National City Bank, two
would have one branch each in Westchester, with the other three having none.
Such an unbalanced banking structure is our major cause for concern in con-
nection with this merger.
96. Opinions in cases of 1960 approved mergers are printed in 47 BD. Govs. ANN.
REP. 134-49 (1961); 98 COMPTROLLER ANN. REP. 52-106 (1961); 1960 FDIC ANN. REP.
112-25 (1961).
97. Hearings Before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in the
Matter of Transamerica Corporation, 8520 (ms. Board of Governors) [hereinafter cited
as Transamerica Hearings]. See also id. at 8969, 8989, 9320. See generally Transamerica
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alternative financial institutions, he believed, had been instrumental in the
significant long-period decline in loans as a percentage of all commercial
bank assets. Even a nation-wide banking monopoly with power to pre-
vent the entry of new banks would not possess a high degree of market
control over the amount and price of credit, Jacoby claimed.
Over 70 per cent of the almost 134,000 offices conducting one or
more commercial bank functions belonged to insurance companies or the
telegraph company. Alternatives do indeed exist for many commercial
bank services: savings deposits, various types of loans (e.g., real estate,
term, agricultural, consumer), the collection of commercial instruments,
the acceptance of drafts, the issuance of letters of credit, the sale of
domestic and foreign exchange, securities transactions, safety deposit box
rentals, trust services and others. With respect to many of these services
the non-commercial bank sources, principally life insurance companies,
savings and loan associations, various consumer lending agencies, govern-
ment lending agencies and private individuals do offer some competition.
However, these sources depend on the commercial banks in the conduct
of their own business, and most of them secure additional credit from
the banks.
The Reserve Board, not impressed with Jacoby's Transamerica as-
sertions, specified that the handling of the money-payment mechanism
and the creation of money were two functions "unique to commercial
banks.' 8 In a third role, that of supplying over 90 per cent of all short
term business credit exclusive of trade credit, "commercial banks occupy
a preeminent position.""'9 It is generally agreed that the loan function,
the activity for which commercial banks are best suited, is their most
characteristic role.' Commercial banking is a line of commerce suffi-
ciently distinct to warrant considering it separately, rather than conglom-
erating it with other types of financial institutions, in the reasonable view
of the Board of Governors.
Almost non-existent in Transamerica's territory, mutual savings
banks are particularly important in New England. They were taken in-
to account in two cases where the Board of Governors authorized a hold-
ing company to acquire a commercial bank. New Hampshire Bank-
shares obtained control of 22'2 per cent of the total commercial bank
deposits in Portsmouth by buying one of the city's three commercial
banks. The inclusion of the two offices of another bank in the trading
Findings as to the Facts, Coitclusions, and Order, 38 FED. RESERVE BULL. 382 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Transamerica Decision].
98. Transamerica Decision at 382.
99. Id. at 390.
100. ROBINSON, MANAGEMENT OF BANK FUNDS 94-95 (1951); ALHADEFF, MONOP-
OLY AND COMPETITION IN BANKING 19 (1954) ; Transamerica Hearings at 8476.
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area (a five mile radius) reduced the share to 17 per cent. Allowing for
savings banks in the area reduced Bankshare's share to only 9 per cent
of the total deposits of the trading area but the acquisition was never-
theless approved.'' The Board also noted the active competition of sav-
ings banks with commercial banks in certain fields in the Baystate case." 2
The Board refused, however, to include savings and loan accounts in com-
puting the market share of First Bank Stock Corporation's banks in the
St. Paul area.' It is clear that in its past administration of the 1956
Act the- Board has considered the "banking field" to embrace only savings
banks and trust companies and no other financial institutions.
If Senator Robertson's interpretation of the 1960 law is correct, the
federal agencies will have to consider competition from other financial
institutions which merging banks face. Several 1960 merger opinions
cited not only savings banks but also savings and loan associations, and
in one case (Berks County [Pennsylvania] Trust Company merger) fi-
nance and small loan companies were considered.'
Relevant Market. Dean Jacoby sought to persuade the Board that
the relevant market area in commercial banking is not confined to the
locality where the bank has its office. Money is very mobile, and its
mobility is enhanced by the National Banking and the Federal Reserve
Acts. Large firms upon becoming dissatisfied' shift their banking
business to other areas, and the system of correspondent relationships
makes the credit and services of other regions available in deficit areas.
The Board agreed with Jacoby that options were available to very
large firms, but argued (correctly) that the average banking customer
did not have such alternatives with respect to distant banks.' In
1949, 75 per cent of the American communities with banking offices
had only one bank. Slightly over half the nation's banks were in
one bank towns. 6 Evidence that Transamerica had gained exclusive
control in thirty-one communities where previously two or more banks
had been located was considered "largely irrelevant" by the Board
101. 44 FED. REsERvE Bur. 433-34 (1958).
102. Id. at 14. For more recent decisions see 46 FED. RE ERVE BULL. 744, 1229,
1231 (1960).
103. 46 FED. RESERvE BULL. 492-93 (1960).
104. 106 CONG. REc. 9713 (1960); 1960 FDIC ANN. REP. 113 (1961); 98 CoMP-
TROLLER ANN. REP. 54, 57, 90 (1961).
105. Transamerica Hearings at 8552, 8557-58. Dr. Emanuel Goldenweiser, economist
for the Board, argued that there was no national market for "current business credit."
Transamerica Hearings at 11,947. See also Counsel Townsend, Conference Between
Governor of the Federal Reserve System and Representative of Transamerica Corpora-
tion 44-45 (ms. Board of Governors, Dec. 11, 1951); Transamerica Decision at 383.
Senator Douglas has stressed local concentration in a Senate speech. See 103 CoNG. REc.
3706 (1957).
106. ALHADEFF, op. cit. supra note 100, at 46, 51.
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of Governors. They defined the relevant market area as the five western
states in which Transamerica then owned banks."0 7 In this "area," Trans-
america controlled 41 per cent of the commercial banking offices, 39
per cent of the deposits, and 50 per cent of the bank loans by 1948 and
intended to expand further. Based on these facts, the Board found an
unlawful tendency to monopoly. In upsetting this verdict, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit pointed out that the Board had not dem-
onstrated that the five states were in fact "a single area of effective
competition among commercial banks." The Board itself had said that
the locality was the true competitive banking area. Nor had the Board
made the necessary findings with respect to the "competitive effect of
Transamerica's bank acquisitions in the communities in which the banks
operate.' 01°
In connection with the application by the First National City Bank
of New York for permission to form a bank holding company which
would buy the County Trust Company of Westchester, the Comptroller
compared First National City with all others doing a nation-wide busi-
ness, defined for this purpose as all banks with over $500 million in as-
sets. Under this comparison, First National City was found to have a
7.5 per cent share of the total assets of such banks.' ° The Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York used as a base of comparison the resources of
all central reserve and reserve city banks; this study gave the First Na-
tional City a share of less than 6 per cent."0  The Board of Governors
chose instead to cite the bank's 19.5 per cent share of total commercial
bank deposits in New York City, which would rise to 20.3 per cent of
the combined New York City-Westchester total if the holding company
was formed. Although the Board prohibited the formation on the
107. Transamerica Hearings at 8461. Yet the Board of Governors' findings in-
cluded a table showing the number of Transamerica-controlled one bank towns in each
of the five western states. The total was 204 at the end of 1947, and 157 of these
stemmed from acquisitions. Transamerica Decision at 385, 390. Counsel for the Board
stated that Transamerica had all the banking offices in twenty-eight counties-over 25%
of the total number of counties in which Transamerica did business. Transamerica Hear-
igs at 4100. Transamerica pointed out, however, that these California counties repre-
sented less than 112% of the state's population. Transamerica Hearings at 4147. The
Board's findings make no reference to this point. The evidence does not support Coun-
sel Townsend's argument that the power resulting from Transamerica's control in the
many one bank towns "has been effectively used for strengthening its control in the
competitive towns." Transanerica Hearings at 4109.
108. Transamerica Decision at 390-91; Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of
Federal Reserve System, 206 F.2d 163, 167, 169 (1953). The flaw in the Board's analy-
sis had already been suggested by Governor Powell's dissent. Transamerica Decision at
396-97. For an assessment of the Board's concept of competition in the Transamerica de-
cision, see Neal, The Clayton Act and the Transamerica Case, 5 STAN. L. REv. 179, 211,
218 (1953).
109. I at 473.
110. It the Matter of First New York Corporation 382 (N.Y.F.R.B. 1958).
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grounds of diminution of actual and potential competition,"' it did recog-
nize that the significance of deposit concentration depends on the size of
the community. Many localities can support but few banks; not so New
York City or Westchester. The Board pointed out that "control by a hold-
ing compafiy of 20 per cent of the total commercial bank deposits in .. .
the financial center of the country, or nearly 50 per cent in Westchester
County, may present a far greater question of consistency with the public
interest than would a considerably higher concentration in another com-
munity."" 2 Three years later the Comptroller of the Currency found it
necesary to disapprove a merger of the above two banks under the 1960
Bank Merger Law, not on antitrust grounds, but for the reason that the
merger would not be "consistent with the public interest" due to the re-
sulting imbalance of the relevant banking structure.'
A primary market area was defined in the Firstamerica decision as
the territory from which about 75 per cent of an office's deposits derive.
The Board found 14 such overlapping areas in Metropolitan Los Angeles
involving 23 of the 27 First Western Bank's offices and 29 of California
Bank's 64 metropolitan branches. The overlapping areas originated 47.6
per cent and 26.6 per cent of the respective banks' total Los Angeles de-
posits. Measured by dollar volume, the merger would eliminate a not
insignificant amount of actual competition. Potential competition was
also at stake, inasmuch as both banks had applications pending for new
branches in the area. In the metropolitan area, where 45 banks have
111. The Board noted that Westchesterites keep many millions in deposits with the
City Bank, while New Yorkers have extensive deposits in County Trust. Commuters
enjoy these available alternatives. More competition between the two banks would tend
to develop, the Board reasoned, as the two areas further integrate their economies. 44
FED. RESERVE BULL. 913 (1958). Governor Robertson cited a similar "foreclosure of
substantial potential competition" in a recent dissent. 47 FED. RESEPVE BULL. 763 (1961).
A unanimous Board denied Bank of Ohio's application to acquire a small local bank,
citing not only the elimination of substantial actual competition, but also that the ac-
quisition "would deprive the area of the benefits of intensified banking competition that
could develop from a more aggressive policy on the part of, or expansion by, the Hil-
liard Bank." 47 FED. RESERvE BULL. 415 (1961).
In five cases where mergers were approved in 1960 the Attorney General cited the
unfavorable effect on potential competition. Thus, combination of two of Lorain, Ohio's
four banks would "permanently foreclose future potential competition between two
healthy banks." 98 COMPTROLLER ANN. REP. 83, 103 (1961) ; 1960 FDIC ANN. REP. 44, 120
(1961); 47 BD. Govs. ANN. R.P. 137 (1961).
112. 44 FED. RESERVE BULL. 912 (1958). It was argued that since two-thirds of
First National City Bank's deposits represented its operations on a national and inter-
national level, they should not be included in determining its size. 44 FED. RESERv BULL.
911, 928 (1958). In disapproving a holding company which would link Bankers Trust
Company with County Trust Company, New York's Superintendent of Banking defined
Westchester as a banking market separate and distinct from New York City. 107 CONG.
REc. A2992 (1961).
113. Treasury Department; Comptroller of the Currency's Decision, Dec. 19, 1961.
See textual discussion of this decision following note 92 supra.
114. 45 FED. RESERVE BULL. 134 (1959).
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their head office, California Bank's share of deposits came to 12.5 per
cent and First Western's to 2.8 per cent. The Bank of America had 41
per cent and Security First National 27 per cent of deposits in this mar-
ket, while the merged First Western would have 15.3 per cent. In ap-
praising the effects of the merger on competition the Board also took in-
to account that California's loans were primarily commercial while First
Western's were primarily real estate and installment. Concluding that
the merger of California and First Western would affect a relatively
small proportion of deposits and that a relatively large number of alterna-
tive bank resources would remain, the Board of Governors approved
Firstamerica Corporation's acquisition of California Bank."' The Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice differed, and filed its first
suit against a commercial bank merger on March 30, 1959 charging a
violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts."6 Under a court approved
agreement Firstamerica (now called Western Bancorporation) had to
dispose of 65 offices with $500 million in deposits to form a new, in-
dependent state-wide bank." 7 Accordingly, early in 1962 the First West-
ern Bank and Trust Company was sold to the newly formed Trans-
World Bancorporation."'
In three 1960 cases where the Attorney General opposed a merger
on competitive grounds the responsible federal agency disagreed over the
definition of the relevant market. The Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration had concluded that the Reading-Berks County banks faced se-
vere competition from Philadelphia and that the Prince George and
Montgomery County banks in Maryland reckoned with "intense compe-
tition from nearby District of Columbia.""' 9 The Comptroller reasoned
that a merger which resulted in Louisville's two largest banks having 64.3
per cent of the city's banking assets would have a "beneficial effect" on
regional competition: Nashville, Cincinnati and Indianapolis all had
banks larger than any in Kentucky.'
Entry. Account must also be taken of ease of entry in assessing the
competitive situation in a given industry. Free and easy entry ordinarily
suffices to assure effective competition, as Jacoby testified in the Trans-
america hearings. 12 ' A test of market occupancy which considers only
rivalry from other financial institutions and from outside the region
while ignoring the potential competition from new entrants is a defective
115. Ibid.
116. New York Times, March 31, 1959, p. 39.
117. Id., Oct. 1, 1960, p. 22.
118. Id., Jan. 11, 1962, p. 43; American Banker, Jan. 11, 1962, p. 16.
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
test. According to Ray Westerfield, entry into banking is still "alto-
gether too free."1 2  This eminent authority has taken the dubious posi-
tion before the Board that the number of newcomers is excessive, govern-
ment regulation notwithstanding. One reason for the fallibility of his
position is that the number of banking offices in the United States has
increased only 20 per cent in the two decades since 1940, despite an over
30 per cent increase in population and a doubling of the real gross na-
tional product.
In the Transamerica decision, the Board of Governors (Powell dis-
senting) developed the concept that a holding company might pre-empt a
promising location not currently profitable. Moreover the mere size of
the holding company might discourage and prevent entry.'23 In 1958,
the Board denied Northwest Bancorporation's application to acquire a
proposed new bank in Rochester, Minnesota on just such grounds.12'
Northwest already owned one of the three banks in the city, with about
30 per cent of the total deposits; a second bank, belonging to another
bank holding company, had 37'2 per cent. On the other hand, a unani-
mous Board approved the acquisition by First Wisconsin Bankshares
Corporation of a proposed new bank in Wauwatosa, a residential suburb
of Milwaukee. The holding company enjoyed a "dominant position in
Milwaukee and its vicinity," with 33 per cent of the offices and 43 per
cent of the deposits in that county.' 2' The new bank was felt to be a
"very considerable convenience to the area" as no new office had been
opened in Wauwatosa since 1920 despite a large population increase and
a substantial gain in business. Others had recently expressed interest in
opening a new bank, but the Board felt that denial of First Wisconsin's
application would "tend to discourage initiative in providing needed bank-
ing facilities."' 28
Effect on Competition. Wisconsin Bankshares Corporation was not
allowed to acquire the stock of a proposed new bank to be located in a
large new Milwaukee shopping center which had no bank at the time.
Bankshares owned three out of the eight banking offices within a three
mile radius of the center. In the city of Milwaukee as well as in the
particular neighborhood, Bankshares is in a strong competitive position.
Just outside the shopping center, less than half a mile from the site of
the rejected bank, a small bank was relocating its office; the Board of
Governors feared the relocating bank's prospects would be adversely af-
122. Id. at 9343.
123. Transamerica Decision at 390, 397.
124. 44 FED. RESERVE BULL. 11-12 (1958).
125. 46 FED. RESER E BULL. 268 (1960).
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fected by the proposed acquisition.17  Similarly, the First Bank Stock
Corporation's application for a new bank in a St. Paul, Minnesota shop-
ping center was denied because the nearest bank was within three and a
half miles of the proposed location. In the view of the Board majority, the
growth and competitive strength of the nearby three year old small state
bank would probably be adversely affected.' In the Greater St. Paul
area as well as in the vicinity of the shopping center, the holding com-
pany's banks control over 50 per cent of the deposits of individuals,
partnerships and corporations. A new bank was subsequently opened on
the contested site by the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company.
First Bank Stock then applied for the addition of this bank to its system.
The Board denied the application on the ground that the acquisition
would eliminate actual and potential competition between the new bank
and First Bank Stock's three existing subsidiaries in the area. 9
The Board denied Marine Corporation's initial application to acquire
the Wisconsin State Bank, the largest and fastest growing independent in
the latter's primary service area. According to the Board, the acquisi-
tion would have tended to "increase further the existing and already in-
creasing competition disadvantage" of the smaller banks in relation to the
Wisconsin Bank; and this disadvantage would not be "fully offset by an
increase in the competition which the [Wisconsin] bank may be in a po-
sition to give the larger banks."' 30 Three months later, however, a ma-
jority voted to approve the acquisition. As part of the Marine system
Wisconsin "would be in an improved position to serve those accounts that
would not look to the smaller banks for service.""' The Board also cited
the "substantial growth" enjoyed by the smaller banks in recent years
and the absence of "evidence that holding company competition in the
area has been overly restrictive.""' Certain studies have indeed indicated
that in most cases the absorption of a bank by an outside institution does
not affect adversely the growth or earnings of a remaining independent
bank."'
A difference of opinion has existed between the Comptroller of the
Currency and the New York authorities over the weight to be given to
the impact of a merger on the competitive position of other banks in the
community where the acquired bank is located. When the State Bank of
Albany informally requested approval of a merger with the Second Na-
127. 44 FFD. REsEvr BuLL. 16 (1958).
128. Id. at 1061-64.
129. 46 FED. RE mwE BULL. 492, 494 (1960).
130. 47 FED. RESERVE BULL. 766 (1961).
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tional Bank of Cooperstown, State Superintendent Mooney informed the
Albany bank of his disposition to disapprove the merger on the ground
that it would place the remaining independent, the First National of
Cooperstown, at a competitive disadvantage. Superintendent Mooney
felt that competition would inevitably be substantially lessened in the
Cooperstown community. Comptroller Gidney later permitted the Na-
tional Commercial Bank of Albany to acquire the Second National despite
Mooney's protestations.""
Six mergers were allowed in 1960 in spite of the Attorney General's
fear of adverse consequences to smaller competitors and consequent tend-
ency toward monopoly.' In seven instances where mergers were ap-
proved in 1960 he expressed misgivings that the approvals would lead to
further mergers. Thus the purchase by Evansville's largest bank of the
smallest bank in that Indiana community might "trigger a chain reaction"
whereby only three banks of the present six would remain. 3 ' The Board
of Governors did refuse to allow United California Bank of Los Angeles
to merge with the First National Bank of La Verne, California, the only
remaining unit bank in an area where three giants (including United)
controlled almost 90 per cent of total deposits.- 7 "Consummation of the
merger here proposed could only strengthen the present concentration of
banking resources under the control of these three banks, give further
impetus to the merger trend in these [La Verne-Pomona and metropolitan
Los Angeles] areas, and thereby tend to discourage the formation of new
unit banks."'38  In another case, the Board recognized that the merger
between California Bank and First Western Bank would be likely to
strengthen the position of subsidiary banks belonging to the resulting
holding company (Firstamerica) in the ten states other than California
where it would own banks, but the Board expected no substantial lessen-
ing of competition.3 9
The Comptroller of the Currency recommended approval of the First
National City application because the resulting holding company would
134. XI at 450-52. See generally 106 N.Y. SuPT. OF BANKS ANN. REP. pt. I, 15-16
(1957).
135. 1960 FDIC ANN. REP. 114, 116, 119, 121, 125 (1961); 47 BD. Govs. ANN. REP.
145 (1961).
136. 98 COMPMOLLER ANN. REP. 70 (1961). See also 1960 FDIC ANN. , EP. 124-
25 (1961).
137. United, 35%; Bank of America, 40%; Security First, 14%.
138. 47 FED. RESERvE BULL. 1407 (1961).
139. 45 FED. REsEvE BULL. 141 (1959). The California Superintendent of Banks
also favored a merger between First Western Bank and the California Bank: this
would create another statewide bank which would offer "true competition" with the
Bank of America. The proposed merger, he stated, would "increase competition on a
statewide basis, and not have any material effect on the operation of unit banks in
California." Firstanerica Hearings 171 (ms. Board of Governors, 1959).
COMMERCIAL BANK MERGERS
tend to increase competition among New York City banks, and also in
some degree among Westchester banks. 4 ' The Reserve Board, however,
anticipated that granting First National City's application would stimu-
late the formation of other bank holding companies in the New York
area; independent Westchester banks had already been approached by
large New York city banks. While additional mergers "might sharpen
and intensify rivalry between a few large banking organizations [it]
would not tend to preserve competition in the banking fields in the sense
of maintaining a relatively large number of independent alternative
sources of banking services."'' In their dissent, Governors Vardaman
and Mills argued that the preservation of competition called for by the
1956 Bank Holding Company Act referred to the "vigor and intensity of
competition, rather than to the mere number of institutions."' 42  Public
policy should be concerned with the quality of competition but in an in-
dustry such as banking where few firms can exist in most markets, em-
phasis on the number of alternatives clearly seems appropriate.
IV. BANKING VS. COMPETITIVE CONSIDERATIONS
In interpreting the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act the Board has
sought more specific congressional guidance on a number of matters, in-
cluding the weight to give the impact of a proposed transaction on the
"current competitive performance of banks in the area," regardless of
their number or affiliation with bank holding companies.'43 The Board
also needs to know how much weight to attach to the long-run impact of
holding company acquisitions on the number of alternative banking
sources, especially independent banks.'44
The 1956 Act instructs the Board to weigh banking'4 ' and competi-
tive40 factors in deciding where the public interest lies. Thus, in approv-
ing Baystate Corporation's acquisition of Union Trust Company for the
purpose of merging it with an existing subsidiary, Springfield (Massa-
chusetts) National Bank, the Board cited the ability of the merged insti-
140. First New York Corporation, Board Exhibit 5, p. 4 (ms., Board of Gover-
nors). The New York Federal Reserve Bank also believed that the formation of the
First National City holding company would stimulate competition. Hearings on First
New York Corporation 389-90 (N.Y.F.R.B.).
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tutions to make the extensive loans needed by the larger Springfield
firms. Three of the seven members of the Board of Governors felt,
however, that the elimination of one of the four large banks in Spring-
field was too high a price to pay for stronger local competition between
two dominant banks in the field of large business loans."4 7 The Comp-
troller has agreed with the Board majority, as exampled by his citation
of the enhanced capability of the Franklin and Meadowbrook National
Banks to compete in service and lending ability with the larger New York
City Banks, in approving the numerous mergers of these Nassau County
institutions.'48
Although a "not insignificant" amount of existing and potential
competition between the second and fourth largest banks in Milwaukee
would be eliminated, the Board approved the formation of a new holding
company to acquire these banks. The three governors in the majority
argued that banks belonging to the Bank Stock Corporation of Milwau-
kee might secure needed additional capital more readily than if they were
independent, and customers of the smaller of the two banks might get
improved service.'49 Governors Balderston and Robertson (the latter
having taken the same stand in the Firstainerica case) dissented on the
grounds that the favorable factors did not sufficiently outweigh the un-
favorable effects on competition."' Robertson, joined by Governor
Szymczak, again dissented on January 25, 1961 when the Board per-
mitted Bank Stock to acquire the Bank of Commerce in Milwaukee."'
"Set in the framework of a situation where four-fifths of all banking in
the area is already controlled by three holding companies, any increase,
however slight, in the strength of any of the three becomes far more
significant."" 2  With respect to this acquisition, the Attorney General
filed suit on March 2, 1961 charging a violation of the Clayton Act."'
The acquisition of the Fillmore State Bank, the only other bank in a
Utah county where the First Security Corporation already owned one
banking office, was approved by the Board of Governors with but one
dissenting vote. As the corporation already had another office sixty
miles away, it would control three of the seven most accessible offices
in the area served by Fillmore. Considerations counteracting these ad-
verse elements, in the view of the Board, were: (a) the negligible over-
lap of banking business between the two offices in the county (note that
147. 44 FED. REsERvE BuLL. 14 (1958).
148. 92 ComEmoLLER ANN. REP. 7-8 (1955) ; I at 474.
149. 45 FED. REsFavE BULL. 1133-36 (1959).
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potential competition was not mentioned), and (b) the problem of man-
agement succession which faced the Fillmore Bank. 4 The succession
factor also loomed large in the Board's unanimous approval of North-
west Bancorporation's purchase of Eveleth, Minnesota's First National
Bank. The relevant market area was delimited to include two nearby
towns, all in the Mesabi Iron Range, with five banks owned by four
separate interests. The acquisition reduced the interests to three, and
Northwest Bancorporation-controlled banks increased their share of de-
posits from one-third to almost half the total in the three towns. The
Board felt that these admittedly adverse factors were counterbalanced by
the possibility that the Eveleth bank might otherwise have been liqui-
dated, leaving the town with no competition. 5'
The 1960 Bank Merger Act likewise requires the three federal agen-
cies to weigh banking and competitive factors. Besides taking "into con-
sideration the effect of the transaction on competition (including any
tendency toward monopoly), . . . [the appropriate agency] shall not
approve the transaction unless, after considering all of such factors, it
finds the transaction to be in the public interest."' 8 Competitive con-
siderations are not necessarily decisive. The Attorney General filed ad-
verse opinions of varying degrees of dissent in about one-third of the 94
cases approved in 1960 by the federal agencies under the new law. In
such instances the agencies either differed with the Justice Department's
assessment of the competitive impact of the merger, or they felt the ad-
verse effects of the merger were counterbalanced by banking considera-
tions-such as management succession problems and the need to improve
services to customers.15 7
Approval by the appropriate agency under the 1960 law does not
immunize an acquisition of assets by a bank from a Department of Jus-
tice prosecution under the Sherman Act.5" On February 25, 1961 the
Department attacked the combination of the Philadelphia National Bank
and the Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank, the second and third largest
in the Philadelphia area, as a violation of both section 1 of the Sherman
Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.15 9 Four days later the merger of
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the First National Bank and Trust Company of Lexington and the Se-
curity Trust Company (also in that Kentucky city) was alleged to con-
stitute a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act."' In August,
Comptroller approval of the second and fourth largest Chicago banks also
resulted in a suit involving both Sherman and Clayton Act charges.' This
litigation was a mutually agreed on exception to an understanding reached
early in April 1961 between Comptroller Gidney and the Department of
Justice.'62 Under the terms of the agreement ,which were to have been
reviewed by the end of September) the Comptroller deferred his final ap-
proval of any merger against which the Department of Justice would feel
impelled to bring an antitrust suit.
Similar agreements had been sought but not obtained from the other
two federal banking agencies. Thus the Reserve Board voted (3-2) to
approve the Boston merger of State Street Trust Company with Rock-
land-Atlas despite an adverse report from the Department of Justice on
the competitive aspects of the proposed merger." 3 Following a like situa-
tion involving Board approval of the Manufacturers-Hanover Bank
merger, the Department of Justice filed suit. 4
V. BANK MERGERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The vital role commercial banks play in financing business means
that the availability of a number of independent sources to which business
and particularly the small enterprise can turn for funds is not a matter
of indifference. In 1940, some 75 per cent of the bank loan credit used by
business was extended to companies with less than $5 million in assets. 6 '
To this day a majority of banks are small businesses making most of
their loans to small concerns.' 0 In the fourteen metropolitan areas with
1950 population between 97,000 and 105,000 an average of only nine
separate banks existed in each area in 1959; there were an average of
twenty-one in the case of the nine areas with population from 557,000 to
727,000.67
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Although in most mergers the bank losing its identity continues as a
branch office, an independent source of credit has nevertheless disap-
peared if the bank was bought by an institution located in the same mar-
ket area. In addition, and unlike the situation in non-regulated indus-
tries, permission is required before new entry can occur. Where a bank
is not economically viable, merger is the alternative to extinction and
offers no dilemma for public policy. However, where a bank is capable
of generating sufficient profits to permit it to retain and attract adequate
capital funds, a merger which may well enhance the income potential of
the bank, and possibly also its ability to improve certain of its services,
nevertheless raises the problem of diminished competition. The signifi-
cance of competition in commercial banking lies not so much in reducing
charges as in providing borrowers with options. In turn, the existence
of alternative sources of bank credit bears on the competitiveness of other
sectors of the economy. To the extent that the preservation of a com-
mercial banking structure with a maximum feasible number of independ-
ent sources of loans and banking services is vital for the interests of
small business, these interests are adversely affected by a more permis-
sive approach to the elimination of independent sources by the merger
route. Such would be the case even if available alternative types of fi-
nancial institutions were fairly close substitutes for commercial banks.
Between proponents of an antitrust test and advocates of a public
utility test for bank mergers the fundamental issue in dispute is the de-
sirable degree of competition in commercial banking. Recognition of the
three federal regulatory agencies' special qualifications to judge banking
factors in a merger proposal does not imply a similar acknowledgement
of these agencies' expertise in the antitrust field. Opposition to granting
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice power to review bank
mergers after they have been approved by the federal agencies was ulti-
mately rooted in the conviction that in cases where consideration of the
impact of a merger on competition might lead to a denial of an applica-
tion, banldng considerations should take precedence. The suits instituted
by the Department of Justice in 1961 should help in clarifying "the rela-
tive importance of competition in deciding whether a proposed merger
would promote the public interest." '' 1 s The advocates of an economy
organized on a basis of decentralized decision making hope for an out-
come where competition will be given more than just one-seventh of the
weight when the seven factors to be considered in a bank merger are
assssed.
A program of promoting competition in banking must include more
168. 107 CONG. REc. 12,090 (July 20, 1961).
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than merely bank merger policy. The chartering authorities must wel-
come the opportunity for other banks to open rival branches where banks
have been turned into branches as a result of merger. New banks should
be authorized where feasible. Regulation of bank activities could be
more permissive without a corresponding derogation of safety. The re-
cent liberalization of Regulation Q (maximum interest rates payable by
member banks on time deposits) is a case in point.
Now that prior approval of the relevant federal agency is required
before any merger of insured banks may take place, the agencies' attitude
toward the factor of competition in assessing the public interest will be
revealed more clearly than hitherto. With regard to railroad acquisitions
the Supreme Court affirmed recently that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission is not so bound by the antitrust laws that it must permit them to
overbear what it finds to be in "the public interest."' 9 If the commercial
banking industry argues successfully for a similar interpretation of the
1960 merger law, it may then face a long-run prospect of unwanted pub-
lic utility-type regulation.
169. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959).
